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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the Tokugawa Period, Japan had a feudal system 
of centralisation. The existence of such a system presup-
posed that political power was unified to a certain degree; 
it also showed that financial power was similarly gathered 
at the centre. One may say that, unless the suzerain pos-
sessed predominant financial power over the other lords, it 
would have been impossible for him to occupy a position 
of political preponderance in the nation. The necessity of 
having immense financial power for securing general obedi-
ence is only too obvious. 
The Tokugawa Family possessed not only a powerful 
feudal lordship ; it also possessed a financial power of stupen-
dous nature over other lords. The area of its fief was as 
large as one·fourth of the areas of all the country and was 
scattered over some 47 provinces. Moreover, the Tokugawa 
Shogunate had command of all territories of political 
importance and cities of vast commercial significance, as 
they were all situated in these 47 provinces. It is undeniable 
that the Tokugawa Government constituted a central govern-
ment the like of which had never before existed in Japan. 
The Muromachi Shogunate, for instance, could never be 
compared with it in point of power and prestige, as it was 
an isolated local power devoid of any faculty of centralisa-
tion, political or otherwise. 
2. CHANGES IN FINANCIAL CONDITION 
CAl. Plenty was the salient characteristic of the finan-
cial condition of the Tokugawa Shogunate during its early 
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stage. When Iyeyasu Tokugawa C!i!!JlI,"<j;IO, the founder of 
the feudal government, retired from active service and went 
to the town of Suruga, he gave 30,000 pieces of gold, and 
silver amounting to 13,000 kan to his son and successor, 
addressing the following instructions to his old retainers 
who had assumed important posts in the feudal government: 
"You must not use the money I now transfer for your 
daily expenses. You must regard it as a public trust and 
increase its amount as much as possible. You must make 
it a rule to balance your budgets in the financial administra· 
tion of the Government. By exercising utmost thrift, you 
must store your gold reserve for the following main pur· 
poses: for possible military campaigns, for relieving people 
in times of calamity, and to provide against crop failures." 
Iyeyasu succeeded in enriching the treasury of his 
government by means of a negative policy of thrift and 
retrenchment and by a positive policy of monopolising 
mines and of expanding foreign trade. His mind was 
occupied with the problems of public finance even after his 
retirement from active service, and when he died he is said 
to have left something like 2,000,000 ryo of gold, which he 
had saved at the town of Suruga. 
His son, Hidetada O,,:~,), the Second Shogun, was content 
with keeping and maintaining his legacy; but his successor, 
Iyemitsu C'"<:J't) , who was a man of lofty ambitions, poured 
out treasure in undertaking public works such as the 
building of the Nikko Shrine. He also increased the fiefs 
of his retainers, and spent much in the suppression of the 
Shimabara insurrection. And yet, all that had no evil effect 
on the financial condition of the Tokugawa Government. 
(B). From the time of the Fourth Shogunate, the 
Tokugawa Government began to feel the pinch of financial 
scarcity, and there were several causes for this. The great 
fire of the Meireki Era, which reduced the greater portion 
of Edo to ashes, imposed upon the Government a great 
financial burden. The construction of Imperial palace on 
two occasions also cost the Edo Government an enormous 
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sum of money. However, its financial difficulties were not 
of a serious nature during this stage, and it was not tiII 
after the commencement of the Genroku Era which was 
noted for its luxurious mode of living, and its spirit of 
decadence that the finances of the Government became 
extremely encumbered. 
During the reign of the Fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi (Wl cil , 
the impoverishment of the Edo Governmant became more and 
more pronounced. He was a lover of luxury and extrava· 
gance and spent a stupendous amount of money in charity, 
music and public works. To aggravate the financial embar-
rassment of the Edo Government, there were frequent 
earthquakes and conflagrations, requiring the expenditure of 
a vast amount of money for the relief of their victims and 
re-construction works. The output of silver and gold pro-
duction had decreased by that time; while the specie of the 
country found its way abroad. The personal corruption of 
the officials in charge of the financial administration of the 
Government increased its difficulties. In order to escape 
from the imminent bankruptcy, the Government re-coined 
money and imposed new taxes on sake and foreign trade. 
The first-named expedient, in particular, was frequently 
resorted to, and during the 17 years between the eighth 
year of Genroku and the first year of Shotoku, money was 
. re-coined four times. Re-coinage, in fact, was the main 
method of financial relief during this stage. 
During the administration of the Sixth and Seventh 
Shoguns, namely, Iyenobu ('1<~in and Iyetsugu ("tl!) , com-
prising eight years, Hakuseki Arai (lW;if B:r;), the great 
historian and economist, tried to adjust the financial condition 
the best he could, but before he was able thoroughly to 
solve the various problems, the Eighth Shogun, Yoshimune 
("'*J. came to hold the reins of government. He was one 
of the most remarkable Shoguns and instituted and carrried 
out many reform measures in order to put his government in 
the former position of financial abundance. Following the 
example set by the founder of the Shogunate, Yoshimune 
~-------
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issued decrees for the purpose of enforcing thrift among the 
people; revised the system of sankin·kotai (~W!»l::f~); estab· 
lished new systems of agemai (1: 'on and tashidaka (JCi<,); 
improved the method of tax collection; did his utmost to 
adjust the price of rice; developed new rice fields; and reo 
coined money. In the 16th year of the Kyoho Era, there 
was a surplus of 35,654 koku of rice and 127,557 ryo of 
gold and silver. At the end of h's 14 years' rule, there 
was a surplus of 792,000 koku of rice and 1,216,000 ryo. 
All this shows that Y oshimure made a stupendous success 
in view of the miserable financial condition at the time he 
became a Shogun. 
However, what he had built up was largely pulled 
down by Iyeshige (*1JO, his successor, within less than ten 
years after his accession, for in the fifth of year of the 
Horeki Era the financial policy established by Yoshimune 
was "slackened and the amount of the Government's 
revenue decreased while its expenditure increased". Thus, 
the Edo Government was again faced by immense financial 
difficulties. It was then decided to fix a part of the Govern· 
ment's expenditure for three years, and to exercise strictest 
thrift thereafter. 
(e). The period of financial disorder commences from 
the time of the next Shogun, Iyeharu O,,/iI), whose ad· 
ministration was in greater part carried on by Tanuma 
Olll!l), a Minister, who exercised a sort of despotic power. 
Such things as the kitchen management, stationery expendi· 
ture and the repairing of the house mats were prescribed 
in detail, so as to forestall any over· expenditure in the 
household management of the ruling family. Under the sway 
of this Shogun, new money was coined; the Imbanuma (EPIIllIB) 
and Taganuma ('F'lt1B 1 Lakes in the Province of Shimofusa 
were reclaimed to be made rice paddies; new mines were 
worked; guilds and a kind of credit organ (kashikinkaisho 
:'''HI Jifr) were created. But after Sadanobu Matsudaira (tl'!' 
If:11il replaced Tanuma under the succeeding Shogun, Iyenari 
(*ilf) , these financial measures were completely abolished, 
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And it is said that as the result of his wise financial policy, 
the surplus of the Shogunate treasury at the end of his ten 
years' administration, from the first of the Kwansei Era to 
the tenth year of the same era, was estimated at 338,000 
ryo. However, his policy of thrift and retrenchment was 
not welcomed by the masses who had become accustomed 
to a life of luxury and extravagance. Up to the Bunkwa 
Era (1804-1817) the total revenue of the Shogunate from 
various sources was estimated at one million ryo per year, 
and this was about sufficient for its expenditure. After this 
era, however, the expenditure of the Government steadily 
increased. This was especially true after the Tempo Era 
(1830-1843). The expenditure was increased to 1.500,000 
ryo at the commencement of this era; it rose to 2,000,000 
ryo in the seventh year, and again to 2,500,000 ryo in the 
eighth and ninth year, thus showing an increase of 250 
percent when compared with the figures at the beginning 
of the Bunkwa Era. All this rapid increase in the ex-
penditure of the Government was not accompanied by a cor· 
responding increase in its revenue, the result being a deficit 
in the Government finance every year. This deficit was 
barely met by loans and the re-coinage of money. Towards 
the last years of the Tempo Era, Mizuno Echizen-no-kami 
(Mfil!!Oij\f) attempted a drastic financial reform by strictly 
prohibiting extravagance, abolishing the guilds, lowering 
prices, increasing taxes, enforcing contributions, and reclaim-
ing and developing the Imbanuma Lake. However, before 
he succeeded in his financial reform, he was forced to resign 
his post. When the country's diplomatic relations with 
foreign powers were marked by serious disturbances towards 
the closing days of the Tokugawa Period, the expenditure 
of the Shogunate was' increased because of the need of 
coastal defence which necessitated the construction of for-
tresses and ship-building yards as well as the purchase of 
war vessels. Its financial difficulties increased at such a 
pace as to make the final overturning of the feudal govern-
ment inevitable. 
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3. THE SOURCES OF REVENUE 
(A). During the Tokugawa Period, the size of feudal 
territories and the revenues of lords, hatamoto (mrr) and 
ordinary samurai were expressed in terms of koku of rice; 
taxes were also paid in rice which, in fact, was the very 
basis of the finance and ecomomy of the times. All this 
shows the important position rice occupied in the revenues of 
the Shogunate. However, rice as the basic revenue of the 
Tokugawa Government was directly secured from its own 
lands in various parts of the country; -and the Government 
had no claim over the crops of lands belonging to other 
feudal lords. There are some tax burdens besides the 
revenue from rice fields, but those are not so important. 
Thus, the main revenue of the Tokugawa Government was 
derived only from the lands directly under its own control; 
this system was radically different from the system that 
existed under the Muromachi Shogunate which collected 
military rice from all parts of the country as a tax. The 
difference between the two systems is worth noting. True, 
there was a system of forced contribution called "agemai" 
under the Tokugawa Shogunate and this was levied on the 
lands of feudal lords as an objective basis, still it was at 
best a temporary financial measure and not a permanent 
system. The following lands were exempted from this tax: 
the shuinchi (*,P:1tl!), or lands such as the estates of shrines 
and temples or those which were exempted from all forms of 
public exactions by a Shogun's document; jochi (1\T;:1tl!), which 
comprised the compounds of temples and shrines and 
historic lands which were exempted from taxes by legal 
prescription; munenguchi CiI!\-'I'lt:1tl!), which comprised roads, 
marshes and sites of some public establishments; misufechi 
(J!.ItIl1!!) , which comprised grave-yards, crematories, slaughter 
houses, and execution grounds; sonchi (lj\:1tl!) , comprising 
lands desolated by landslides, inundation and other natural 
calamities. All other lands were regarded as being produc-
tive and therefore subject to taxation, although in some 
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special cases exemption and allowance for tax deductions 
were permitted. 
Besides land, there are some other sources of revenne, 
such as the business of commerce and industry-those taxes 
are calld unjo (iiI[J:) or myoga (~Jnt)-and the labour of 
mankind. But those are not of so much importance as the 
land. 
(B). Revenue from various privileges must be con-
sidered. Wben the Tokugawa Family rose to rule over the 
country, it confiscated the money saved by the Toyotomi 
Family, its predecessor and rival house, as well as by the 
fiefs of other lesser nobles. Revenue from all these sources 
undoubtedly added to the resources of the Tokugawa 
Government, which, however, had certain privileges that 
were used for securing further revenue. Its enterprises and 
the right of coinage need special mention. 
The Shogunate had large pastures at Sakura (joloj!t) and 
Koganehara ('h1t1!!) and managed mining enterprises in 
various parts of the country. We shall not dwell on the 
pastures because they were primarily necessary from the 
military standpoint. As to its mining enterprises, the most 
important ones were the gold and silver mines of Sado Island. 
This island originally belonged to the Lord of Uyesugi (J:*;) , 
but as there were gold and silver mines on it, it was taken 
over by the Toyotomi Family and then by the Tokugawa 
Family. The Edo Government placed the Sado mines under 
the personal supervision of Nagayasu Okubo (j'!<.i:;lf<'tn and 
it was said that during the prosperous times, gold and silver 
on Sado produced "1,000 kan during the day and 1,000 kan 
during the night". The silver mines in the provinces of 
Iwami and Izu were also actively worked, and provided an 
important addition to the Shogunate revenue. 
The Shogunate also possessed the right of coining gold, 
silver and copper money which were circulated throughout 
the entire nation. The Government derived revenue by re-
coining: money in order to patch up its financial deficit; 
and thus its right of coinage was an important source of 
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revenue. 
(C). The Shogunate also derived no small amount of 
revenue from contributions from feudal lords and other 
people, both in money and goods. Traders often were 
required to make loans called goyokin (lIiJ)!j~), especially 
after the middle of the Tokugawa Period, and this also was 
one of the principal sources of revenue. These" loans" 
were rather forced from the chonin (my A) or the trader 
class as well as from other wealthy people. We may then 
say that class property was one of the important revenue 
sources of the Edo Government. 
Nor was this unnatural. Although the period being a 
feudal period whose economy was one of "rice economy", 
it was marked by the wide extension of money as the 
medium of exchange and by the rapid rise of commoners. 
All these phenomena eventuallY determined the sources of 
the Government's revenue. Thus the land tax from the 
direct fiefs of the Shogunate, profits from re·coinage and 
loans were important sources of public revenue. 
4. THE SHOGUNATE'S RECEIPTS FOR THE XmTH 
YEAR OF THE TEMPO ERA 
Now that the sources of government revenue have been 
explained, let us go deeper into this problem and consider 
it in detail. There is a very scanty historical source 
showing the facts concerning the administration of public 
finance during the feudal period. The following figures are 
given in the SUijinroku (1I1(!'l!t*), edited by Kaishu Katsu 
(lJl}lJiJi-) : 
Receipts and Expenditure for the 13th Year of Tempo 
Ordinary revenue ... "" .. , "",,'.''',, ..... ,." ... 925,099 ryo 
Land tax."" " ........ ' ",,' ..... " .... " ,. """ 550,374 ryo 
River navigation tax ' ..... " .. " ",,",,' 3,203 rI'o 
Tax paid by the hatamoto in lieu of their 
labor service to the state """.""' ... '" 
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Tax paid by traders at Nagasaki ...... ".... 22,792 ryo 
Contributions raised for river administra-
tion .............................................. . 
Debts paid back by samurai ................. . 
Contributions made in goods valued at .. . 
Special revenue ......................................... . 





money ............................................. 557,322 ryo 
Annual quota of contribution from the 
lords in connection with the repair of 
the Nishimaru Palace ...... ............... ... 29,727 ryo 
Government expenditure ........................... 1,453,209 ryo 
Special expenditure .................................... 156,469 ryo 
Deficit in ordinary accounts ........................ 528,110 ryo 
The foregoing figures show that the total amount of 
the regular revenue of the Shogunate during the 13th year 
of the Tempo Era (1842) was 920,000 ryo and that of the 
expenditure, 1,450,000 ryo, the deficit being more than 
528,000 ryo. The fact that the amount of special revenue 
constituted 40 percent of the total revenue and 63 percent 
of the ordinary revenue testifies to the financial stringency 
of the times and the financial unstability of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate. The profit from re·coinage exceeds the revenue 
from the land tax and constitutes 38 percent of the total 
amount of revenue, thereby showing the important position 
it occupied in the finances of the Shogunate, and in relieving 
it from its financial difficulties. 
We shall show in the following table how the tax 
burden was borne by the different classes so far as it is 
possible to specify them: 
Burden on the Samurai Class (in ryo) 
Contributions ............................................ . 
Contributions raised for river administration .. 
Tax paid in lieu of labor service .............. . 
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Burden on the Farming Class 
Land tax ................................................... 550,374 
Percentage ................................................ 84 % 
Burden on the Chanin Class 
River navigation tax ................................ . 
Tax paid by traders at Nagasaki ............. .. 
Percentage ............................................ .. 





Percentage ...................................................... 100~'; 
The tax burden of the commoners is not exactly repre· 
sented in these figures inasmuch by the 13th year of Tempo, 
the system of toiya (r.:JI1l!) or guilds had been abolished by 
the Reform of Tempo and the tax paid by guilds was no 
longer enforced. However, it is undeniable that the over· 
whelming portion of the tax burden fell upon the farmers. 
On the other hand, if the "loans" made by the wealthy 
traders to the Shogunate are included-and in some cases 
they were never paid back-the tax burden of the com· 
mercial class would reach a considerable amount. 
As the figures are not precise, it is impossible to go into 
detail, but, roughly speaking, the land tax borne by the 
farmers, the loans made by the commoners, and the profit 
yielded by re'coinage make up the governmental income. 
5. RELATIONS BETWEEN FINANCE AND RICE PRICE, 
AND RE·COINAGE AND LOANS MADE 
TO THE SHOGUNATE 
(A). Relations between public finance and the price of 
rice. During the Tokugawa Period, rice was not merely 
the principal staple product and food of the people; because, 
of the peculiar economic conditions prevailing during that 
period, rice formed the foundation of the finances of the 
Central as well as of the clan governments, and taxes were 
expressed and paid in terms of rice, and largely paid in 
the grain itself. On the other hand, money came to be 
----------~ 
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used more and more extensively, and both the Shogunate 
and the feudal lords made payments in money as well as 
in rice, though the salaries of their retainers were usually 
paid in kind. Before payments in money could be made, 
one had to exchange his rice for money, and this necessity 
had dire effects upon the finance of the samurai class; for 
it was clear that fluctuations in the price of rice was 
inevitably accompanied by fluctuations in the amount of 
the revenue calculated in money. 
One may think that the Shogunate derived an enormous 
revenue when the price of rice was exuberantly high, but 
this was not so, because the high price of rice was mostly 
caused by crop failures which meant a small amount of rice 
revenue; moreover, the Government had to spend much 
money in the relief of poverty·stricken farmers and had to 
adopt various measures for the purpose of adjusting the 
price of rice. Thus, the prevalence of a high price of rice 
did not benefit the treasury of the feudal government. The 
fact that the Shogunate faced a financial predicament be· 
cause of a bad crop is shown by a decree issued in May, 
in the seventh year of the Kyoho Era (1723) which runs as 
follows: "In consequence of the failure of rice crops in 
recent years due to frequent storms and floods, a shortage 
has been reported in the official treasury, be it understood 
that there will be some delay in the distribution of rice to 
the hatamoto and in the payment to merchants." 
Nor could it be said that a fall in the price of rice 
was necessarily fonowed by a reduction in the Shogunate 
treasury's revenue in money. As a fall in price is usually 
occasioned by a good harvest, the amount of rice turned in 
as tax was enormous. On the other hand, the amount 
of the proceeds from the sale of the revenue rice was not 
equally huge. When money economy was yet in its un· 
developed stage, a good rice crop might have made the 
finances of the Shogunate easy and comfortable; as soon 
as currency economy was developed to such a point as to 
require the exchange of rice for money for the efficient 
ON THE FINANCE OF THE TOKUGAWA GOVERNMENT 27 
administration of public finance, a depreciation in the price 
of rice ipso facto was bound to affect the public treasury 
unfavourably. A phenomenon like this was bound to arise 
as a result of the paradoxical economic organisation of the 
Tokugawa Period which was born of the co·existence of 
rice economy and money economy. Although the effect of 
the fluctuations in the price of rice on finance is clear 
enough, such a fluctuation caused by a good or a bad 
crop was liable to affect public finance to a degree that is 
hardly imaginable at a normal time when the price is 
maintained at an appropriate rate. 
(B). Relations between finance and re·coinage. As has 
been alreadY pointed out, re·coinage was resorted to as a 
measure of relieving the Shogunate of its financial difficul-
ties. There is only one exception, that in the case of the 
re-coinage made during the Kyoho Era, the purpose of 
which was to improve the debased currencies of the Gen-
roku Era and revive the system of the Keicho Era. Almost 
all other cases of re-coinage had as their aim to derive a 
profit therefrom and had the effect of deteriorating the 
qualities of the currencies. 
Hakuseki Arai pointed out that the profit called "deme" 
em §) from the re·coinage of money during the Genroku 
Era amounted to about five million ryo. Although it is 
impossible to find out the total amount of such profits 
during the entire period, the following are the figures for 
the years between the third year of the Tempo to the 
thirteenth year of the same era: 
Year I Surplus or Revenue Expenditure Deficit Deme Deficit (marked 6.) 
3 1,218,011 1.593,909 375,898 391,200 18,304 
4 1,223.241 1,646,832 423,591 540,000 116,409 
5 1,173,907 1,790,051 616,144 470,596 ~HS,517 





1,963,750 312,223 499,844 187,621 
8 1,901,817 2,467,902 566,085 629,263 63,178 
- - - - - - -----~ .... ---.. -----------' 
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9 2,202,436 2,512,666 310,230 1,075,950 765,720 
10 1,706,451 2,180,922 474,470 694,745 220,275 
11 1,422,487 2,001,958 579,471 577,000 417,529 
12 1,090,590 1,962,684 872,094 1,155,000 282,906 
13 1,259,702 1,963,911 704,291 501,445 ~202,764 
The foregoing table shows that not in a single year were 
the authorities of the Government able to make both ends 
meet; that they had to resort to re-coinage every year; and 
that thrice that method failed to adjust the balance between 
revenue and expenditure, The total amount of deme during 
the eleven years of the Tempo Era was estimated at 7,558,-
043 ryo. What would have been the fate of the Shogunate, 
had no such financial scheme of relief been actually 
employed? 
Now, it should be noted that financial relief was the main 
reason for the adoption of this method by the Government; 
but the desire of officials in charge of the gold and silver 
mints to keep up their industrial activities was mainly 
responsible for the frequent re·coinings, These persons had 
an ample business while gold and silver were produced in 
great quantities; but, after the production of these metals 
had decreased, they were placed in a difficult position 
financially, and the only way to keep up their activities 
was re·coinage, The large·scale re·coinage during the Gen-
roku Era was planned out even as far back as 30 years 
before, or during the Kanbun Era, by the stoff of the gold 
and silver mints, 
(C). Relations between finance and loans to the 
Shogunate. These loans were a financial burden placed on 
the merchants for the purpose of making up the deficit in 
government finance, and were supposed or held to be made 
voluntarily by them. Ostensibly they were to be redeemed, 
but in fact for the most part, they were not. They were 
rather to be regarded as forced or patriotic, so·called, loans. 
Although the general purpose of such loans was to 
make up the deficit in the Government's finance, they were 
------------ - ------- ---------------------- -------------------------------
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often spent on various individual instances. They might be 
spent for one of the following purposes: for the relief of 
the financial difficulties of some feudal lord or lords; on 
some gigantic public works; for the adjustment of the price 
of rice; and for military and coastal defense. The money, 
however, was to be used, in its fundamental aspect, in 
providing financial aid for the Shogunate, although the 
actual cases in which it was spent were diverse. 
Wealthy commoners in such cities as Edo, Kyoto, 
Hyogo, Osaka, Nishinomiya, Sakai, etc. frequently received 
orders for loans from the Central Government; but those 
in Osaka most frequently received such orders. Those 
wealthy tradesmen who received official "suggestions" for 
loans usually made petitions that the amount mentioned be 
reduced. Frequently, the differences between the amounts 
asked for and the amounts obtainable from such commoners 
were considerable; nor did the Shogunate authorities always 
live up to the loan stipulations and pay either interest or 
principal. 
One of the most frequent purposes of these loans was 
to raise the price of rice, for such a policy was beneficial 
to the ruling class which really supplied this staple product, 
for the high price of rice meant a relief for the poverty· 
stricken feudal lords and a financial surplus for the 
Shogunate itself. The policy of maintaining the price of 
rice at high levels, however, was aimed not only at the 
relief of the daimyos and the Shogunate, but that also of the 
samurai class in general as well· as the farming population 
who were the tillers of the soil. On the other hand, the 
fact remains that the loans after the Tempo Era were 
incurred almost exclusively for the benefit of the Central 
Government, for they played a signal role in making up its 
financial deficits. 
6. EXPENSES OF THE SHOGUNATE 
The expenses of the Tokugawa Government were divided 
into the following three groups: joshiki (~:<l: ordinary), 
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betsukuchi (EI) iJ separate), and rinji (""~f temporary). It is 
difficult to assign them to the prevailing classification of 
ordinary expenditure and extra·ordinary expenditure. More· 
over, it is impossible to know the expenditure of the 
Tokugawa Government in detail, because of the extreme 
secrecy which was enforced. The following table shows the 
expenses of the Government for the 13th year of the 
Tempo Era: * 
Josh iki Expenses (in ryo) 
Kirimai (t]Jill;) and yakuryo (iltil',) payment 
Expenses in the Shogun's palace .. , ... , .. "" .. " .... " 
Expenses at the eight offices ". " .. , "'" .. " ....... ,. 
Expenditures of the Shogunate's various offices .. , 
Expenditures outside Edo .... "." ....... ,," ...... " ... 
Allowance to the sanke (='.*), and sankyo (='.9IiD 
(six main branches of the Tokugawa Family) " 
Allowance to Lord So of Tsushima ."." ........ . 








government of the Shogunate)" .. " ....... "." .... " 21,803 
Payment for timber ....... "" .. " ..... ""."." .... " .... " 63,645 
Expenditure for the transportation of rice ... "... 34,163 
Expenditure for repair works, both in Edo and 
elsewhere and other miscellaneous expenses.. 54,791 
Total ....... " ......... " .. ,'" .. , .. , ............... 1,066,777 
Betsukuchi Expenses (in ryo) 
Expenditure of river administration ............. "... 33,329 
Payments to be made out of the Shogun's loans .. 116,738 
Payments to be made out of the interest on the 
Shogun's advances ."."" ..... " ............. "" ... 
Payments to be made out of the reserve fund 
Total ." ...... " ... "" ........ "." " ..... " " .. 
Rinji Expenses (in ryo) 




other shrines, on ceremonies, coinage, etc. "". 172,713 
Grand total ....... " ..... " ...... ".".... .. " ...... 1,423,256 
·:f Y. Takekoshi, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization 
of Japan, vol. II. p. 338 etc. 
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Of the joshiki expenses, the two chief items are those 
on kirimai and yakuryo, and those for the eight government 
offices. Kirimai was a pension for hatamoto who had no 
domain land; it was paid three times a year in both rice 
and money. Yakuryo was a kind of salary for government 
offices. These were in fact personnel expenditure. The 
samurai who received kirimai or yakuryo lived on that 
revenue. This personnel expenditure was the largest in· 
dividual item in the current expenditure of the Edo Govern-
ment. By the eight offices are meant the following: the 
onando (lIIlii'l)")' Nishimaru·onando (i'9 :lLi!lJI~J"), osakuji·kata, 
(lIIllllJj>li), kofushin-kata (+'l\',~}j), on-makanai-kata (lIIlP,ff1i), 
osaiku-kata ('iI1JIU1J), on-tatami-kata (lIIl1'l! 1JJ , on-zaimoku-kaia 
(lIIltblcJ;). These and the next item, namely, .. expenditure 
of the Shogun's various offices", comprise the major portion 
of the Government expenditure of the Shogunate. Of the 
former, the expenditure for onando, Nishimaru-onando 
and on-makanai-kata is made up of the living expenses of 
the Shogun Family; and the second item, namely, expenses 
in the Shogun's palace must be the salaries of persons 
employed in the palace. 
During the Tokugawa Period, there was no budgetary 
system such as we have today. The maximum amount of 
revenue was made the basis of the expenditure. After the 
middle of the period, however, when the Shogun's Govern-
ment was faced by serious financial difficulties, thrift began 
to be exercised, and it was after December in the third 
year of Kan-en (1750) that a sort of budgetary estimate 
was adopted. But this budget concerned only the living 
expenses of the Shogun Family and did not include the 
main items, such as the salaries of the samurai who received 
kirimai or yakuryo. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The chief principle of public finance during the Toku-
gawa Period was to base expenditure upon revenue. Today, 
although we consider the ability of the people to bear tax 
"----- --------.. -- .. ---.--~-~ 
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burdens, we first decide on the amount of government ex-
penditure necessary for the administration of state affairs, 
and then the ways and means to derive revenue necessary 
to cover that expenditure are sought. Thus, expenditure 
precedes revenue_ But exactly an opposite principle was 
practised by the authorities of the Tokugawa Shogunate_ 
This method was not limited to this period_ It had, in fact, 
been the established custom in all ages from time im-
memorial, but the scholars of the Tokugawa Period ardently 
upheld tbis principle both in theory and in practice; and 
the statesmen of the times also were fully conscious of it_ 
Thus, it must be noted that there was no difference in 
principle between public finance and individual household 
acconnts; and in point of fact, it was undeniable that in 
actual practice there was no clear line of demarcation, 
naturally enough, between the finances of the Shogunate 
and the household accounts of the Tokugawa Family_ 
Except in its initial stages, the Tokugawa Shogunate 
always suffered from financial difficulties due to various 
causes, such as crop failures and other natural calamities, 
reduction in the output of gold and silver, outflow of cur-
rency, increase in government expenditure, wide-spread 
existence of luxury, personal corruption of officials in 
charge of public finance, and a thousand and one other 
causes_ But the greatest and fundamental cause is to be 
found in the social economic system of the time_ 
At first, the farm was almost the only means of produc-
tion and on the farm itself was the feudal government 
founded. But with the advance of the age, agriculture came 
to be faced by a deadlock, commerce and industry arose 
and currency came into use in greater degree; the result 
being that the Shogunate became no longer able to exist on 
the revenue from the self-sufficient agricultural products of 
its own lands_ Accordingly, it had to welcome affably the 
moneyed commoners newly coming into prominence, and 
treat with them for financial assistance and pretend to be 
grateful for the new economy that ushered them in. In 
------------ -----
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other words, the Shogun's Government was no longer able 
to depend upon the economic system on which it was based, 
and was compelled by circumstances to ask for the assistance 
of a class which it had previously disdained and disregard· 
ed. It could no longer stand on its own bottom, and was 
obliged to trust in the development of a money economy 
which was inconsistent with its own economic foundation, 
for the improvement of its financial lot. Therein lies the 
basic cause for the financial misery as well as the final 
collapse of the Tokugawa Government. 
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